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Foreign investor protection and climate action: a new price tag for urgent policies 
Gus Van Harten* 
26 November 2015 
To respond to climate change, the world needs to shift rapidly from high-carbon assets, especially fossil 
fuel resources and related infrastructure, into clean energy. This will require a massive change in 
investment and the adoption of public policies to support and incentivize the right kinds of investment.  
From a climate perspective, not all investment is equal. Desirable investment in clean energy needs 
encouragement and protection, while undesirable investment in fossil fuels needs clear policy signals to 
avoid further investment in destructive activities and stranding more assets. Similarly, over-investment 
in fossil fuel infrastructure creates both massive emissions and roadblocks to climate action. 
In theory, trade and investment agreements are supposed to protect all forms of foreign investment, 
including from new laws and regulations that affect the future revenue stream. For this purpose, they 
use arguably the most powerful legal mechanisms known to international law today: investor-state 
dispute settlement, or ISDS. This “climate blind” mechanism presents a problem as not all forms of 
investment are compatible with a stable climate. ISDS puts a priority on foreign investment protection 
that skews the playing field in favour of larger incumbents in the resource sector at the expense of 
domestic investors and smaller players in alternative energy.  
ISDS gives foreign investors alone a special right to bring costly claims against countries when they 
introduce new laws and regulations. As explained below, ISDS is broadly and expansively framed, 
lending itself to sweeping challenges in the most climate sensitive areas of public policy: resource 
extraction, and public and environmental health.  In turn, ISDS gives a powerful tool for one or a few 
large fossil fuel companies to frustrate climate change action. As recent revelations about Exxon have 
suggested, such companies can play an important role in delaying decisive action on the climate 
challenge.  
ISDS can be understood as a system of public insurance for foreign investors. With ISDS, foreign 
investors are entitled to compensation for the value of their assets – including future revenues – against 
“risks” of democratic and political decision-making. If a legitimate public policy or measure creates costs 
for a foreign investor, e.g. to reduce greenhouse gas pollution, the investor can sue for compensation. 
This set-up inverts the “polluter pays” principle; due to ISDS, polluters have had to be paid from public 
funds after they were required, in effect, to stop polluting. With the risk of uncertain, uncapped financial 
liability in ISDS, governments face a powerful deterrent to pursuing and fulfilling their climate change 
responsibilities. 
These are not idle concerns. Foreign investors have used ISDS already to challenge government 
decisions to phase-out nuclear energy (Vattenfall v Germany No 2), limit industrial gold mining (PacRim 
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v El Salvador), restrict a gasoline additive in order to protect auto emissions control systems (Ethyl v 
Canada), and ban gas fracturing in a major river and estuary (Lone Pine v Canada). The presence of these 
and other cases shows how major companies can use ISDS to frustrate regulatory changes that they 
oppose. As one Washington, D.C.-based law firm put it in a client advisory: 
“Investment treaty protections should be carefully considered by foreign investors operating in 
the energy sector…. It may well be possible to use such protections as a tool to assist lobbying 
efforts to prevent wrongful regulatory change, or they may prove essential in obtaining 
compensation.”1 
In short, foreign investment protection in trade and investment agreements creates a potentially 
massive roadblock to successful climate policy at all levels of government. Though trade and investment 
agreements could play a positive role to support climate action, at present they do the opposite by 
creating incentives for governments to avoid climate action because of the financial risks of ISDS. 
In the brief that follows, evidence is presented on how ISDS tilts the playing field in favor of entrenched 
incumbents and against urgent action on climate; on the potential for a massive expansion of ISDS 
litigation and risks to climate policy in proposed trade deals; and on key flaws in recent European 
Commission proposals to reform ISDS. For one step that could be taken to prevent ISDS from being used 
to frustrate climate action, see this proposal for an ISDS carve-out in a multilateral climate change 
agreement: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2663504. 
ISDS distorts the market in favour of bigger incumbents 
 
ISDS distorts market signals that could otherwise internalize climate costs by giving large foreign 
companies special access to compensation for new laws and regulations. It is reasonable to expect that 
these distortions benefit incumbent resource companies at the expense of new entrants in renewable 
energy. Because they are not foreign or because they are too small to afford ISDS, most companies do 
not have access to such compensation, putting them at a competitive disadvantage. They must account 
for risks of regulation in other ways by buying other forms of insurance, bargaining for stronger dispute 
settlement clauses in contracts with government, or relying – like everyone else – on the protection 
given by domestic courts and tribunals.  
ISDS disputes often involve decisions about health, the environment, or natural resources 
Two common themes in ISDS are disputes in the resource sector and disputes relating to health or 
environmental protection. Both themes point to potential disputes about climate change measures. In 
the absence of a comprehensive climate policy, other environment and public health-related regulation 
has gained prominence in the effort to restrict investments in fossil fuels at all levels of government 
from local to national. It is precisely these measures that can be attacked by one or a few hold out fossil 
fuel incumbents. 
To illustrate, in a review of 196 ISDS claims, it emerged that 34 cases involved conflicts over natural 
resources including oil and gas, gold, lumber, fisheries, and water.2 Many of these cases involved vast 
sums as arbitration tribunals dealt with competing claims to natural resources, allocation of benefits and 
risks of resource extraction, and associated social and environmental consequences. 
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In the same review, it emerged that 40 cases arose from government decisions on public health or 
environmental protection.3 The health theme was apparent in cases concerning health insurance, 
drinking water, food safety, pharmaceuticals, environmental health, pesticides regulation, and anti-
tobacco measures. The environmental theme arose from decisions on water, land, and biodiversity 
conservation; pollution control; mining remediation; hazardous waste disposal; and liability for 
environmental contamination. A related group of 21 cases involved planning or permitting decisions by 
local governments. 
ISDS tribunals have broad power over public budgets due to their authority to award uncapped amounts 
of compensation to foreign investors 
 
Unlike at the World Trade Organization, in ISDS countries have no opportunity to avoid liability after a 
tribunal has issued its decision. Compensation orders are retrospective and uncapped and ISDS litigation 
costs are high. As a result, countries face unique incentives to avoid climate change action in order to 
limit their potential liability in ISDS. 
 
Indeed, ISDS has led to awards of unprecedented size to foreign investors in the context of international 
review of sovereign countries. The total ordered compensation in ISDS has been approximately as 
follows based on a review of 86 ISDS awards (all amounts in USD):4 
 From states to large5 or extra-large6 companies:  7.5 billion 
 From states to very wealthy individuals7:   1.1 billion 
 From states to other individuals8:    325 million 
 From states to other9 companies:    270 million 
 
 Total from states to foreign investors:   9.2 billion 
Foreign investors’ rights to compensation are broadly-framed and open to expansive interpretation 
Foreign investors’ protections are often stated ambiguously in treaties that allow for ISDS. In turn, such 
rights are subject to broad discretion of ISDS tribunals to decide issues of state liability. The foreign 
investor protections typically invoked by tribunals when ordering compensation have been those of ‘fair 
and equitable treatment’ and compensation for ‘indirect’ expropriation. Both protections have been 
interpreted by tribunals as broad entitlements to compensation for foreign investors, despite qualifying 
language or exceptions that purport to protect health or environment measures. 
For instance, in a review of 56 instances in which ISDS arbitrators determined whether the concept of 
fair and equitable treatment (FET) was limited to its most obvious roots – in the minimum standard of 
treatment for foreign nationals in customary international law, which is generally deferential to a 
country’s right to regulate – 73% of the arbitrators’ resolutions took the expansive view that FET could 
be interpreted autonomously from customary international law.10 Also, in 83% of 137 instances, an 
arbitrator adopted an interpretation of FET going beyond the customary meaning of the minimum 
standard and thus enlarging foreign investors’ entitlements to compensation in the face of democratic 
and regulatory decision-making by countries.11 
 
In the case of “indirect expropriation”, 72.5% of arbitrators, in 120 instances where the interpretive 
issue arose, took an expansive approach to the concept by requiring compensation for foreign investors 
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(i) by focusing exclusively or primarily on the effect of a law, regulation, or other decision on the foreign 
investor at the expense of other factors including the regulatory purpose of the decision or (ii) by 
adopting a low threshold of ‘significant’ or ‘substantial’ impact on a foreign investment in order to 
identify an indirect expropriation requiring full compensation by the state. 
 
In many of these cases, expansive foreign investor entitlements to compensation emerged from a treaty 
that also included qualifying language or exceptions ostensibly protecting countries’ right to regulate, 
including in environmental matters. There was comparatively little evidence of an expansive approach 
by arbitrators to such qualifying language and exceptions. 
 
In effect, ISDS creates a one-sided ‘purity test’ for new regulations. A government must not put foreign 
companies at a disadvantage or create new regulatory costs for foreign companies, but it can give them 
unique advantages including, in ISDS itself, special access to public compensation.  
 
General laws and regulations are not immune 
  
ISDS tribunals have interpreted foreign investor protections in ways that require compensation even for 
general, public purpose changes to a country’s regulatory framework that are applied indiscriminately to 
all asset owners. 
 
In a review of 158 ISDS cases up to the spring of 2010, approximately half of the cases were found to 
have involved challenges to decisions that were general in their application in that they appeared likely 
to affect other constituencies, such as other companies, employees, unions, consumers, or sub-national 
levels of government.12 Although it was difficult to classify some cases as involving challenges either to 
general or to specific decisions, many ISDS cases clearly engaged matters of general policy or discretion, 
such as in the review of measures that banned the export of a hazardous waste, regulated exploitation 
of natural resources, auctioned rights for a telecommunications network, or managed water use for a 
major river.13  
 
Foreign investors can bring claims for virtually any action by a country’s legislatures, governments, or 
courts. They can also bring claims against European Union institutions, for example, where the EU is a 
party to the underlying trade agreement or investment treaty. 
The explosion of ISDS claims has mostly benefited big multinationals and the very wealthy 
If we assume that incumbent interests are heavily committed to fossil fuels, then ISDS poses an even 
greater concern. ISDS claims began to explode in the late 1990s and, since then, large foreign companies 
and very wealthy individuals – often operating in the resource sector – have used ISDS to pressure 
governments and win compensation. 
 
For example, in a review of 86 ISDS awards favouring a foreign investor, about 95% of ordered 
compensation went to companies with over USD 1 billion in annual revenue or to individuals with over 
USD 100 million in net wealth.14 Major oil companies in particular have used ISDS and have won huge 
amounts of public compensation. These include, for examples, awards to Occidental Petroleum totaling 
over USD 1 billion, to Mobil Oil totaling about USD 2.1 billion, and to Chevron totaling at least USD 96 
million.15 
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Further, extra-large companies, with over USD 10 billion in annual revenue, have a relatively high 
success rate in ISDS. In 48 cases, their success rates at the jurisdictional stage, merits stage, and 
combined stages were 88.5%, 82.9% and 70.8% respectively.16 This exceeded the success rates for all 
other foreign investors across 166 ISDS cases: 76.6%, 57.9%, and 42.2% respectively. 
 
Finally, the high cost of ISDS – estimated at USD 8 million on average in legal and arbitration costs for 
both sides per case, with costs exceeding 30 million in some cases17 – makes it effectively inaccessible to 
the great majority of small and mid-sized companies; moreover, domestic investors have no right at all 
to bring ISDS claims. On the other end, the high cost of ISDS puts more pressure on governments facing 
the risk of a claim by a large multinational or billionaire. 
 
Governments are at the brink of a huge expansion of foreign investor protection and ISDS 
 
To date, Western European countries have never agreed to ISDS on a comprehensive basis18 with the 
U.S. or Canada (or amongst themselves). If they were to do so, especially in the proposed EU-US 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA), it is reasonable to expect many more ISDS claims and compensation orders. 
 
To illustrate, Canada is the only Western developed country that has agreed to ISDS on a comprehensive 
basis with the U.S. Also, Canada is one of the top-5 most-sued countries in ISDS, worldwide.19 
 
Measured by the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to which it would apply,20 the 
proposed TTIP alone is far more significant than all existing treaties allowing for ISDS. For example, the 
TTIP would cover about 50-60% of investment flows in and out of the U.S. whereas only about 15-20% of 
those flows are covered by existing treaties. Alongside the TTIP, a few other treaties now pursued by 
governments– especially the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), EU-China investment treaty, and U.S.-China 
investment treaty – would expand ISDS coverage to over 80% of the investment flows. 
 
The European Commission’s recent proposal on investment in TTIP does not reform ISDS or safeguard the 
right to regulate adequately  
In November 2015, the European Commission released a proposed text on foreign investor protection in 
the EU-US TTIP.21  In the proposal, the EC adopts a new acronym to describe ISDS: ICS, which stands for 
“investment court system”.22 While it has some positive elements, the EC’s proposal leaves in place too 
many of the key problems of ISDS and the corresponding threats to climate action.  
Procedurally, too many flawed ISDS elements remain in the EC’s proposal – including elements that give 
rise to unacceptable appearances of bias among ICS “judges” –to use terms like court and judge without 
being misleading. In particular, the ICS “judges” would continue to have a financial interest in future 
claims where only one side – foreign investors – can bring claims,23 they would operate under the usual 
ISDS arbitration rules,24 they would not necessarily satisfy conditions for judicial appointment in any 
country,25 and they would not be barred from working on the side as ISDS arbitrators.26 
There is a promising signal in the EC’s proposals: an apparent commitment to establish a full 
international investment court to replace ISDS in existing treaties.27 However, this aspect is undermined 
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by the EC’s choices about sequencing: the EC is pursuing a version of ISDS in TTIP before going ahead 
with an international court to replace ISDS in existing treaties. 
Substantively, the EC’s proposal includes a right to regulate,28 but the text includes features that 
severely undermine the right to regulate in future cases. The features are as follows. 
i. The wording of the right to regulate in Article 2(1) of the EC’s proposed text includes a 
“necessity test” for state decisions that are protected by the right to regulate. While this test 
might sound reasonable on its face, it has been applied in exceedingly strict ways by a large 
majority of ISDS tribunals faced with the issue.29 Thus, the EC’s proposal will make it very 
difficult for a challenged law, regulation, or other decision to be safeguarded by the EC’s version 
of the right to regulate.30 
 
ii. The wording of the right to regulate in Article 2(1) – when interpreted in the context of the 
express override of any requirement for a state “to compensate the investor” that is included in 
Article 2(4) but not in Article 2(1)31 – makes it clear that compensation orders issued by ISDS 
tribunals for a new law, regulation, or other decision are not precluded or limited by the right to 
regulate in Article 2(1). This discrepancy creates a major gap in the EC’s proposal because 
compensation orders, and the potentially huge price tag they put on future decisions, are at the 
heart of concerns about ISDS and the right to regulate.32 
 
iii. Similarly, in Article 2(2), the wording of the state’s right to “change the legal and regulatory 
framework”, read again in the context of Article 2(4), makes it clear that compensation orders 
for legal or regulatory changes are not precluded or limited by the state’s right in Article 2(2). 
 
iv. The compensation orders mentioned in items ii. and iii., above, would typically include 
reasonable-expected lost profits for a foreign investor even though Article 2(2) appears to 
preclude awards of expected profits.33 Since Article 2(2) does not apply to compensation orders 
by ISDS tribunals, as explained above, the arbitrators’ standard approach of awarding expected 
profits as part of a monetary compensation award, as allowed for in Article 28(1) of the EC’s 
proposal, would take over.34  
These aspects undermine almost entirely the EC’s proposal on the right to regulate and the right to 
change the legal and regulatory framework. Under the EC’s proposal, foreign investors can still use ISDS 
– as in most ISDS cases so far – to challenge decisions in areas of agriculture, consumer protection, 
culture, energy, environment, financial security, intellectual property, land use, mining, public health, 
taxation, or transportation.35 Likewise, ISDS tribunals can still order huge amounts of public 
compensation for foreign investors in any of these areas. The EC’s proposal does not alter this 
situation.36 
Conclusion 
For a trade and investment agreement to support climate action, they must not give expansive rights 
and powerful tools for large, incumbent resource companies to thwart such action. Already, ISDS has 
been used to undermine legislatures and governments in areas closely linked to climate-friendly policies 
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of prevention, mitigation, and adaptation. Public funds should be used to support the shift to clean 
energy not to compensate polluters for their lost future revenues when they have not adapted their 
business model in a timely and responsible way. 
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